Hezbollah has been dealt a heavy blow, but it can still win against Israel | Israel-Lebanon attacks

With the assassination of Hezbollah’s secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah, on September 28, Israel has brought the ongoing conflict to a critical juncture. The killing, which involved the dropping of dozens of 2,000-pound bombs on the densely-populated southern suburbs of Beirut, came on the tail of a violent aerial campaign that killed more than 500 people in the span of 24 hours. That was preceded by unprecedented attacks on Hezbollah’s rank and file using booby-trapped pagers and other communication devices.

All of this has provided Israel with a significant tactical advantage. If sustained alongside other tactical operations, these efforts could weaken Hezbollah’s ability to respond effectively. The attacks have dealt a major blow to the chain of command of the Radwan Force, which has not yet been deployed in this conflict, and whose involvement is contingent upon the appointment of new commanders as well as the strategic progression of the war. The assassination of Ali Karaki, the commander of Hezbollah’s southern front, although of symbolic significance, does not appear to affect Hezbollah’s capacity to continue expanding the range of fire on Israeli cities.

Israel’s ultimate goal with these attacks is to decouple its war on Gaza from the conflict in Lebanon – that is to force Hezbollah to stop supporting Hamas by attacking northern Israel. The Israeli government is using escalation as a means to achieve this goal. A successful decoupling, the Israelis believe, would create a rift among the members of the axis of resistance, which Hamas and Hezbollah are both part of.

But there is a risk that this Israeli approach will backfire. Israel may, in fact, find itself in a situation similar to 2006, when it was the stronger side but still lost its confrontation with Hezbollah due to the paradox of escalation. This is because, in asymmetric war, relatively weaker entities can win by simply employing strategic patience, prolonging the war and forcing their stronger opponent to expend significant resources, ultimately depleting them.

It is important to point out that Hezbollah cannot back down from this confrontation, even at a heavy cost in terms of its leaders’ lives. The stakes are extremely high; if it were to retreat, it would not only lose the trust and confidence of its supporters, but it could also jeopardise the strategic deterrence it has built since the 2006 war with Israel. That is why, the surviving Hezbollah leadership is likely to fight to the end.

In the present case, all Hezbollah has to do is mobilise its remaining capabilities to continue its rocket attacks on northern Israel, which will prevent the Israeli army from securing the return of evacuated residents, and resist Israeli attempts to push its forces north of the Litani River through a ground offensive.

Even if the Israeli army does not face fierce resistance, whatever advances it makes in the “limited ground operation” it just declared may be temporary. It would, therefore, face the choice of whether to expand the operation or not.

Hezbollah continues to respond to Israel’s escalation with a restrained approach, hoping to provoke it into initiating a full-scale invasion. For Hezbollah, an escalation into ground warfare offers considerable tactical advantages.

The presence of Israeli ground troops would limit the effectiveness of Israel’s air force. For example, the F-35 would not be used in areas where Israeli troops are clashing with Hezbollah due to the risk of Israeli soldiers dying in such bombardment. Other tactical aircraft may also have limited use, as Hezbollah may be equipped with anti-aircraft missiles.

Additionally, Hezbollah’s forces are more familiar with the challenging terrain of southern Lebanon, giving them a major advantage. Over the years, Hezbollah has also developed a robust logistical and military infrastructure designed to support prolonged ground warfare in this area.

Furthermore, for Hezbollah, fighting Israeli troops on the ground offers an opportunity to further solidify its image as a resistance group among the Arab public – an image that was relatively eroded due to its involvement in the Syrian civil war.

An open long confrontation with Israel would reposition Hezbollah as the leading resistance faction in the Arab world, bolstering its image as a staunch defender of Palestinian and Arab interests. This renewed standing would likely enhance its influence across the region and could strengthen its ability to recruit volunteers and gain support from Arab and Muslim communities.

Israel will likely try to avoid engaging in a prolonged, open confrontation that requires redeployment of its troops deep across the border into Lebanon. High personnel losses could lead to mounting pressure on the Israeli government to pull out, presenting Hezbollah with a victory.

However, the current Israeli strategy of intense bombardment to force Hezbollah to accept a ceasefire on Israeli terms has its limits. While the current US administration is readily replenishing Israel’s depleted arms and ammunition stocks, it is doing so at an ever-increasing cost.

Although the US establishment remains in full support of Israel, a significant segment of American voters on both sides of the political spectrum opposes this support for ethical and economic reasons. Whoever gets elected in the US presidential election will likely feel compelled to put an end to Israel’s endless escalation, possibly by threatening to cut weapons supplies. That is why, Israel is in a hurry to establish new facts on the ground in the region before the elections.

On the other hand, for Hezbollah and other resistance movements, this is fundamentally a war of attrition that will continue, even if Israel manages to achieve some early successes. Although Hezbollah has faced considerable losses over the past two weeks, it still has the potential to declare another victory over Israel. Similar to Hamas in Gaza, survival alone can be considered a success. These are likely the calculations being made in Beirut, as well as by its strategic supporters in Tehran.

In the end, Israel’s attempts to create a rift within the axis of resistance may have the opposite effect. Recent history suggests that instead of causing division, the escalation of Israeli operations bolsters public support for the resistance while also reinforcing the unity among its members in Lebanon, Palestine, and beyond.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.